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EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-ADMISSIBILITY OF HISTORY STATEMENTS IN HosRECORD UNDER BusINESS ENTRIES STATUTE-Plaintiff sued for injuries allegedly resulting when the door of defendant's bus closed on plaintiff's
ankle as he was attempting to board the bus, throwing him to the ground.
Defendant offered in evidence, under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, in effect in Delaware,1 hospital records containing the entry: "Patient
states he twisted ankle while walking along the street." The interne who
treated plaintiff and qualified the records had no independent recollection of
the statement. On appeal from judgment for defendant, held, the record was
properly admitted, although no witness could testify of his own memory that he
heard the statement made. A statement is made within the regular course of
business as required by the statute only if it is so related to the injury as to
facilitate prompt and intelligent diagnosis and treatment. ,Here the statement
was "pathologically germane" as an indication of the nature of the injury.
Watts v. Delaware Coach Co., (Del. 1948) 58 A. (2d) 689.
In the twenty-four jurisdictions which have adopted either the Uniform Act
of the principal case or the Commonwealth Fund Model Act for Proof of
Business Transactions, 2 hospital records are uniformly allowed in evidence to
show the injuries and medical treatment of the patient.8 But when the record
purports to relate the cause of the injury, courts have excluded it as "pure
hearsay,'.' 4 or on the ground that it is self-serving,5 or because the entrant
had no personal knowledge of the facts recorded. 6 It has been argued that
"regular course of business" is a term of art which requires an investigation of
each case to determine the trustworthiness of the evidence. 7 The principal case
PITAL

1
45 Del. Laws (1945) c, 252-4-704-A, § 19A. '~••• A record of an act, condition or event, shall, in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or the
person who made ·such record or under whose sµpervision · such record was made
testifies to its identity and· the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the
regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if,
in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission." Cf. 9 U.L.A. 264 (1942). Enacted
in fourteen states, 9 U.L.A. 85 (1947 Supp.)
2 "Any writing or record • . . made as a memorandum • • • of any act, transaction, occurrence or event shall be admissible in evidence ••• if ••• it was made in
the regular course· of any business and it was the regular course of such business to
make such memorandum or record. . • • All other circumstances• of the making of such
writi:q.g or record including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may
be shown to affect its weight but ••• not its admissibility." MoRGAN, THE LAw OF
EVIDENCE 63 (1927).
8 144 A.L.R. 731 (1943); Hale, "Hospital Records as Evidence," 14 So. CAL.
L. REv. 99 (1941).
•
4 Sadjak v. Parker-Wolverine Co., 281 Mich. 84, 274 N.W. 719 (1937).
5
-Schmitt v. Daehler Die Casting Co., 143 Ohio St. 421, 55 N.E. (2d) 644
(1944); Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 280 Mich. 378, 273 N.W. 737 (1937) •
6
.
Lane v. Samuels, 350 Pa. 446, 39 A. (2d) 626 (1944); Johnson v. Lutz, 253
N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930) (policeman's report).
7 Hoffman v. Palmer, (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 976 (railroad engineer's
accident report). By such a view, if examination revealed sufficient trustworthiness in
the facts, the court would admit the record, whether or not made in the regular course
of business.
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expressly rejects this view to follow that line of cases which interpret the statute
to allow the admission of those facts which are so related to the injury as to
facilitate prompt and intelligent diagnosis and treatment. 8 Since the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness of hospital records as business entries is to
be found in the fact that the medical personnel of the hospital commonly rely
on the record for diagnois and treatment, 9 it seems logical to require that records
admitted should bear some reasonable relation to that purpose. In the instant
case, the court felt that the question of whether the ankle was crushed in the
door or simply twisted was sufficiently important to the treatment to warrant the
admission in evidence of the statement, in view of the fact that no X-ray specialist was on duty at the time of admission to the hospital. Some writers have
suggested that if a statement falls within the scope of some other exception to
the hearsay rule, it should be admissible when entered in the record, irrespective
of its relation to diagnosis or treatment.10 This rule has apparently not been
accepted by the courts,11 and the logic of the principal case indicates that a
declaration against interest which is irrelevant to the treatment or diagnosis,
although admissible if testified to directly, would· be excluded if offered as part
of the hospital record on the basis that there is no assurance of accurate reporting. On the other hand, if the entry is germane, it would be regarded as trustworthy, though self-serving, and thus not otherwise admissible.12 It should be
noted, however, that the statute gives the court power to consider the sources
of information, and the court might consider the source of a self-serving statement not "such as to justify its admission." In Green v. Cleveland,1 8 the
failure of the record to show that the statement was made by the plaintiff
was apparently considered a sufficient basis for exclusion in itself. In the principal case, the record said "patient states," and although plaintiff contended
the source was unreliable because he was unconscious on admission to the hospital, the court referred to other evidence that plaintiff was conscious and the
fact that the record did not show that he was unconscious, concluding that it
8

Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477 (1943) (an engineer's accident
report to the railroad was excluded on the basis that it had little or nothing to do
with the operation of the business as such); Commonwealth v. Harris, 351 Pa. 325,
41 A. (2d) 688 (1945); Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E. (2d) 245 (1947).
9
6 W1GMORE ON EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 1707 (1940).
10
23 TEX. L. REv. 178 at 186 "(1945).
11
Cf. Green v. Cleveland, (Ohio 1948) 79 N.E. (2d) 676, where the court,
as in the instant case, admitted that the statement, "How happened: Fell off street
car, caught heel," would be admissible as a declaration against interest if made by the
plaintiff to a third person called to testify (in view of plaintiff's theory that the injury
was caused by the sudden starting of the ·street car), but held its admission was reversible error, because not incident to the treatment and outside the knowledge or
observation of those creating the record.
12
Cerniglia v. New York, 182 Misc. 441, 49 N.Y.S. (2d) 447 (1944).
Where the record as a whole is kept for a self-serving purpose, h~wever, it would still
be excluded as not germane to the treatment or business. The Delaware court in
the principal case apparently considered Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct.
477 (1943), as such a case.
18
(Ohio 1948) 79 N.E. (2d) 676 at 677.
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was for the jury to decide what weight to attach to the statement. While the
Uniform Act seems to give the court greater discretion as to the reliability of the
sources of information than the Model Act,14 it is obvious that to require a
showing that the statement was actually made by the patient would in many
cases defeat the purpose of the act ·to avoid the necessity of showing personal
recollection of the events recorded. Whether or not the record says "patient
states" may depend simply on the wording of the blank form used for the
hospital admission record. Some courts have concluded that it is immaterial
whether the patient or a third party made the statement,15 and exclusion because of the unreliable source of information has usually involved more serious
failings. 16 But it is still uncertain under what circumstances the court will
consider the unreliability of source sufficient for exclusion, and when it will
affect only the weight of the evidence.

Ralph E. Hunt

14 Cf. the Uniform Act, " ••• if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information ..• are such as to justify its admission," 9 U.L.A. 264 (1942), with
" .•. all other circumstances . . • may be· shown to affect its weight but not its
admissibility," MoRGAN, THE LAW OF EvrnENCE 63 (1927).
·
15 Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Scherpenisse, (Md. 1946) 50 A.
(2d) 256; Medina, "Current Developments in Pleading, Practice and Procedure in
the New York Courts," 30 CoRN. L.Q. 449 at 454 (1945).
16 Beverly Beach Club, Inc. v. Marron, 172 Md. 471, 192 A. 278 (1937)
(plaintiff was not allowed to use his statement in the record where he admittetl his
lack of knowledge on the subject).

